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This paper examines the structure and the evolution of the patents declared as essential for three 
major technical standards in information technology (MPEG2, DVD and W-CDMA). These 
standards have many essential patents, which are owned by many firms with different interests. 
Many patents have been applied even after the standard was set. We analyze three important 
reasons for why the essential patents are many and increase over time: they cover a number of 
different technology fields, there exist R&D competition even in a narrowly defined technology 
field and a firm can expand its patent portfolio by using continuations and other practices based 
on the priority dates of its earlier filed patent applications in the USA. Around 40% of the 
essential US patents for MPEG2 and DVD standards have been obtained by using these 
applications. However, our empirical analysis suggests that a firm with pioneering patents does 
not obtain more essential patents, using these practices. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the structure and the evolution of the patents declared as essential for three 
technical standards (MPEG2, DVD formats and W-CDMA). Patents have become important in 
technical standards especially in information technology (IT) area in recent years, since the 
standards often incorporate cutting-edge technologies and the firms owning the patents on these 
technologies are not willing to contribute them to a standard for royalty free. A patent is 
essential to a standard, if making a product or using a method complying with the standard 
infringes it
i.While exercising such patent right may enhance the appropriability of R&D 
investment from the perspective of a single firm, it may cause the inefficiency due to a patent 
thicket problem when many firms independently try to collect royalty (Heller and Eisenberg 
(1988), Shapiro (2001), Lerner and Tirole (2002)). The analysis of the structure and the 
evolution of the essential patents of these standards would provide important clues on how the 
patent thicket problem might emerge in a standard setting process as well as on appropriate 
policy responses. As for as we know, a deep empirical study of the patent thicket problem is 
scarce (an exception is Hall and Ziedonis (2001)) and there is no empirical study on the 
essential patents of a standard from this perspective.   
  Let us briefly explain three technical standards which we focus on (see Table 1 for a 
summary). MPEG2 is the second set of flexible compression standards created by the MPEG 
(Moving Pictures Experts Group) and was adopted as the ISO/IEC 13818 international standard 
in December 1994. It is widely used for encoding and decoding the audio and video in digital 
format. There is a patent pool administered by MPEG LA, which certify essential patents for 
collective licensing in video technology. It started to license the bundle of the essential patents 
in September 1997. DVD (Digital Video Disc or Digital Versatile Disc) is optical disc 
technology and can store a large volume of digital data for full-motion video. The standard for  3
the player format of DVD was developed by a private consortium (the DVD forum) with its 
decision on the standard in December 1995. There are two patent pools, 6C group and 3C group, 
both of which certify and license different parts of the essential patents for DVD. No consensus 
was struck for the standardization of the recorder format of DVD and these pools also license 
the essential patents for the recorder formats. W-CDMA (Wideband Code Division Multiple 
Access) is one of the 3rd generation wireless technologies (3G) as approved by the ITU in 
November 1999. While W-CDMA is most likely to have many essential patents, judging from 
the number of the patents declared to be essential with respect to standard bodies such as ETSI 
(The European Telecommunications Standards Institute) and the ARIB (Association of Radio 
Industries and Businesses, Japan), there exist no comprehensive patent pool (or platform) 
organization which covers a significant part of the essential patents for collective licensing, 
although the 3G patent platform was established in 2003, with a small number of the members.         
                     ( T a b l e   1 )  
  We analyze the structure and the evolution of the essential patents, based on the 
information made public by the patent pool organizations for MPEG2 and DVD formats, and 
the standard body (ARIB) for W-CDMA. Note that the patent list of the ARIB is likely to 
contain many non-essential patents, since no third-party certification of these patents have been 
made (According to one experts evaluation
ii, only 21 % of the patents declared to ETSI are 
actually essential). In section 2, we analyze who have essential patents to a standard. In section 3 
we explore the reasons for why there are so many essential patents. In section 4, we assess the 
frequency of the patents which a firm has obtained by using the continuations and other 
applications based on the priority dates of earlier patent applications, and whether a firm with 
pioneering patents can obtain more subsequent patents, using these practices. Section 5 
concludes.  4
2. Structure of the essential patents   
The numbers of essential patents for a standard are many and are owned by many organizations. 
As shown in Table 1, there are 127 patent families of essential patents owned by 23 patentees as 
of July 2004 in the case of MPEG2. This covers only those owned by the members of the patent 
pool which is administered by the MPEG LA., which covers around 90% of the essential patents 
according to an industry expert. There are 800 licensees in November 2004.Lucent and IBM are 
the major non-members of the patent pool. The number of the essential patents held by the 
original 8 members of the patent pool (7 firms and one university) increased from 34 families in 
July 1997 to 83 families in July 2004 by 49 families. This can be compared to the increase of 
the essential patents owned by the pool, simply due to the expansion of the members, which 
amounted to 44 families.   
  In the case of the DVD formats, there are 311 (=180+131) essential US patents for 
players and 272 (=166+106) essential US patents for recorders as of December 2004, which are 
covered by two patent pools
iii. There are 7 firms in 6C group and 4 firms in 3C group. Both 
groups widely license its technology (179 licensees in the case of 3C and 245 licensees in the 
case of 6C for player). Thomson is a major non-member firm of the pools, although it was a 
member of the DVD forum. In the case of W-CDMA, there are no substantial third party 
evaluations of the essentialities of the patents. 954 patents in terms of the number of US patents 
have been declared by the patentees as essential for the W-CDMA technology to the ARIB (the 
Association of Radio Industries and Businesses of Japan as of November 2004)
iv. There exist 24 
patentees for the standard according to the declaration to the ARIB.       
  Not only many patents and many patentees are involved in technical standard, but also 
their membership is heterogeneous. As shown in Table 2, although a manufacturing firm which 
is both the licensor to the standard as well as the user of the standard is most numerous, it  5
accounts for 80% of the firms with essential patents. Non-manufacturing user such as an 
operator firm and pure licensor firms, such as a firm specialized in R&D or in patent portfolio 
management and a university, are also important, accounting each for around 10 % of the firms 
with essential patents.   
                         ( T a b l e   2 )  
3. Why so many essential patents?   
In this section we examine several reasons why these standards cover so many patents. For this 
purpose, we have analyzed both the distributions of the essential patents over technology fields 
defined by IPC (International Patent Classification) as well as their time profile. Table 3 shows 
such distributions for the DVD format. This shows that the standard covers a large number of 
different technology areas, reflecting its technological sophistication. As shown in Table 3, the 
essential patents of the DVD covers the half of 8 IPC sections, that is, physics, electricity, 
human necessities and performing operations, 11 of 120 IPC classes and 25 of 724 IPC 
subclasses. Similarly, the MPEG2 covers 2 IPC sections, 4 IPC classes and 8 IPC subclasses.   
                     ( T a b l e   3 )  
  Second, a number of firms own the essential patents in the same technology field, even 
if the latter is relatively narrowly defined by the classification based on IPC subclass, which has 
more than 720 classifications. As shown in Table 3, more than 10 firms own essential patents in 
the following two IPC subclasses in the case of DVD. They are G11B: information storage 
based on relative movement between record carrier and transducer, and H04N: pictorial 
communication, e.g. television. Moreover, there are 14 IPC subclasses for which more than two 
firms own essential patents. Similarly, 14 firms own essential patent in IPC subclass H04N in 
the case of MPEG2, and there are 5 IPC subclass for which more than two firms own essential 
patents. These indicate the severity of R&D competition in terms of the number of participants.  6
  The ex-post increase of the number of essential patents after the standard is set is also 
important, as shown in Figure 1. This Figure classifies the essential US patents into the 
following four categories in terms of their registration, application and priority dates relative to 
the date of standard determination. The group R covers those registered before the month of the 
first determination of standard specification. The group P covers those applied before the month 
of the first determination of standard but not yet registered before that month. The group C 
covers those applied on or later than the month of the first determination of standard 
specification, with the priority date before the month of the first determination of standard 
specification. Finally, the group A covers those with the priority dates on or later than the month 
of the first determination of standard specification. As shown in Figure 1, only a minority of the 
patents (group R) are registered before the first determination of standard specification: 34 % for 
MPEG2, 15% for DVD (player) and 25% for W-CDMA. This implies that the standard 
specification is developed and agreed at the stage when most essential patents are still pending 
or still to be applied. Thus, as far as the granted patents are concerned, the patents follow a 
standard rather than vice versa, and the number of the essential (granted) patents increases after 
the standard is set. In light of this finding it makes a good sense that the disclosure policy of the 
standard bodies such as ITU-T covers both granted and pending patents.   
                          ( F i g u r e   1 )  
  The time lag between the patent application and the grant is an important reason for 
why the patents are often granted after the standard is set. As shown in Figure 1, the essential 
patents which are applied but not yet registered before the initial determination of a standard, i.e. 
the pending patents when the standard was being negotiated (group P), account for the similar 
shares of the essential patents as above: 33% for the MPEG2, 17% for the DVD format (player) 
and 35 % for the W-CDMA. However, it is also true that a significant part of the patents are  7
applied even after the standard is set, even though the priority dates of these patents are before 
the initial specification of a standard (group C): 34% for the MPEG2, 41% for the DVD and 
25% for the W-CDMA. Thus, the number of essential patents can increase long after the 
determination of the initial standard. These ex-post applications for the essential patents may 
pose a question of how a firm can satisfy the novelty requirement for a patent once the standards 
are published. This puzzle can be resolved by the availability of continuation, 
continuation-in-parts and divisional applications by which a firm can get a new patent, using the 
priority and the disclosure of earlier filed patent applications. That is, in these applications, a 
firm can use the priority date of earlier filed patent applications to secure the novelty (see 
Lemley and Moore (2003) and Quillen and Webster (2001) for the details of continuation 
applications in the US). The continuations, continuation-in-parts and division practices are in 
fact important in the ex-post expansion of the essential patents granted, as we will see in the 
following section. 
In the case of DVD and W-CDMA, there are a fairly large number of essential patents, 
the priority dates of which were more recent than the month when the standard was initially set 
(group  A). The most likely explanation is the revision of the standards, incorporating new 
technology. There are four revisions of the standard for DVD (reader) and two revisions for 
W-CDMA by the end of 2004, which have added new functions. Although there is no systematic 
information available with respect to how many new patents are added to the revision, the 3G 
patent platform provides information on which essential patent is relevant to which version of 
the standard for the essential patents of its member firms. According to this information, the first 
revision prepared from March 2000 to March 2001 (v.4 of the standard specification) added 14 
patents to the original 83 patents and 4 out of 14 patents have priorities more recent than the 
month when the standard was initially set
v.  8
Finally, we would like to discuss the economic incentive for ex-post application for 
essential patents, by using continuation and other practices based on the priority dates of its 
earlier filed patent applications. If a firm can acquire an essential patent after the standard is set, 
such firm can potentially collect a significant amount of royalty by threatening to hold-up the 
users of the standard. Such risk gives exactly the reason why standard bodies require the 
participants in standard setting to disclose the essential patents as well as to commit to the 
royalty free licensing of their essential patents or to their licensing under RAND (Reasonable 
And Non-Discriminatory) conditions, including those found after the standard is set. In addition, 
the patent pool makes a commitment to the maximum royalty for the bundle of the patents of its 
member firms. That is, the total royalty rate charged by the pool on the users of the standard is 
fixed, independent of the number of essential patents. Even given these commitments, an 
individual firm can still increase its share of royalty income by increasing the number of its 
essential patents, if the royalty income is distributed among the patentees according to the 
number of the essential patents owned by these firms as in the case of the patent pools of 
MPEG2 and DVD (6C). In addition, a firm with a strong patent position would be able to affect 
significantly the future evolution of the standard, since the backward compatibility requires the 
continued use of the existing essential patents. Thus, a firm has a clear incentive to expand its 
patent portfolio for a standard.   
4. Does a firm with pioneer patents make more use of the patent applications based on 
earlier priority dates?   
One important reason for why we see a significant ex-post increase of the essential patents 
granted for a standard are the use of continuation and other applications based on the priority 
dates of the patent applications made earlier. Table 4 summarizes how the patentees of the 
essential patents have used these practices, including continuations, continuations-in-parts and  9
divisions, in acquiring the essential US patents. The ratio of the patents which were obtained by 
using these practices amounts to 44% of the essential patents for MPEG2, 46% for DVD (6C) 
and 36% for DVD (3C). Thus, the patent applications taking advantage of earlier priority dates 
are extensively used for the essential patents of these standards. The fact that these practices are 
more heavily used in DVD(6C) than in DVD(3C) seems to be consistent with the pattern of 
incentives. The royalty is distributed according to the number of essential patents for 6C, while 
such is not the case for 3C.       
                         ( T a b l e   4 )  
Among the three practices using the earlier filed patent applications, continuations are 
most often used, which account for 47% of the practices, followed by divisions (44%) and 
continuation-in-parts (9%). These practices are used 2.3 times per patent, among the patents 
using these practices for MPEG2, 1.2 times per patent for DVD (6C) and 1.3 times for DVD 
(3C), where the denominator refers to the patents using these practices. 
If a firm with more pioneering patents for the development of the standard can use 
more of these practices, it would help distributing more of the royalty income to such 
pioneering firm. If this is the case, we would expect that a firm with high quality patents in the 
early stage would have a higher ratio of the patents using these practices in its portfolio of the 
essential patents acquired ultimately by such firm. For simplicity, let us assume that a firm k has 
k n   essential patents with quality  k q   which are applied before the determination of a standard. 
We assume that a firm does not use the continuation and divisional practices in such stage. We 
further assume that such firm can obtain additional essential patents using the continuation 
(including continuation-in-parts) and/or divisional practices, the number of which is 
proportional to  k n  with the coefficient ) ( k q f , which increases with  k q . Thus, denoting the 
number of such patents by  k m , we have    10
) ( k k k q f n m =                                        ( 1 )  
Given these assumptions, the share of the essential patents of firm k which have been obtained 
using these practices in its total essential patents ( k θ ) is given by 
)) ( 1 /( ) ( ) /( k k k k k k q f q f m n m + = + = θ                  ( 2 )  
Thus, if the above view holds, we would observe the positive correlation between  θ  and q. 
Proposition 1 
If the main effect of the availability of continuations, continuations-in-parts and divisional 
patent applications is to allow a firm with pioneering patents with rich written descriptions to 
obtain more subsequent patents based on these descriptions, we would observe a positive 
correlation between the quality of the inventions in the standard development stage (q) and the 
share of the patents which are obtained using these practices (θ ). 
 
In order to test the above proposition, we implement a simple estimation based on the 
following equation: 
k k k k k mpeg age citedness y contcipdiv contcipy ε β β β β + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ) ln( ) (     ( 3 )  
The dependent variables are the share of the US patents obtained using continuations or 
continuations-in-parts (contcipy) or that of using continuations, continuations-in-parts or 
divisional applications (contcipdivy) by firm k until 2004 in its total US essential patents for 
MPEG2 and DVD (player). The explanatory variable is the quality of the essential US patents of 
firm k in the standard formation stage. We use the average forward citations of the US essential 
patents applied before the initial standard determination as a variable representing such patent 
quality (citedness), which excludes self-citations in order to control the endogeneity of the 
forward citation variable(a patent obtained by a continuation practice is likely to cite the original 
patent).Forward citations are up to September 2006 for MPEG2 and September 2004 for DVD.  11
We introduce the difference between the average application year of the essential patents in the 
standard formation stage and 2005 as a control (age). An essential patent applied earlier would 
have more chance being cited for a given patent quality. In this context we expect a negative 
coefficient of the variable age  since an older patent has a smaller downward bias due to 
truncation problem in citation. On the other hand, an essential patent applied earlier would have 
more chance to be used for generating patents based on continuation and other practices. In this 
context we expect a positive coefficient of the variable age since an older patent has a larger 
chance for being used for such objective. We introduce the standard dummy (mpeg) controlling 
the standard fixed effect, which can take into accounts the difference in citation structure among 
standards, including the degree of truncation bias. In addition to the above basic specification, 
we also estimate the following extended specification (equation (4)). It incorporates the number 
of the essential patents of firm k applied in the standard formation stage (patentbs) and the 
square of age as additional controls. There may be diseconomy of scale with respect to patentsb 
in expanding the number of essential patents due to the internal overlap of such patents in patent 
scope within a firm. In addition, the effect of age may be nonlinear.   
k k k
k k k k i
mpeg age
age citedness patentsb y contcipdiv contcipy
ε β α
β β α β
+ +




2 1 1 0 ) ln( ln ) (
 (4) 
The sample for estimation focuses on the firms with at least three essential patents. The 
descriptive statistics is offered in the appendix.   
Table 5 provides estimation results. As shown in Table 5, the variable (lncitedness) 
which represents the quality of early-stage patents has a negative and significant coefficient (5% 
or 10% level) in both the basic specification and the extended specification. The estimated size 
of the coefficient of this variable is very close between the basic specification and the extended 
specification. The firm with high quality early stage patents tends to have a smaller number of  12
essential patents obtained through continuations and other practices which take advantage of 
earlier priority dates. This is the case for both the share of the essential patents using 
continuations or CIPs and for the share of the essential patents using continuations, CIPs or 
divisions, although the explanatory power is larger for the latter specification. As for the other 
independent variables, age has a significantly negative coefficient, implying that truncation bias 
is more important. In addition, there is some evidence for diseconomy of scale with respect to 
the number of the essential patents in the standard formation stage. In summary, a firm with 
pioneering patents does not obtain more subsequent essential patents, using these practices, 
rejecting Proposition 1.   
               ( T a b l e   5 )  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the structure and the evolution of the patents declared as essential for 
three major technical standards in information technology (MPEG2, DVD and W-CDMA).  
These standards have many essential patents, which are owned by many firms with different 
interests. The fact that there are numerous patentees suggests that the benefit from cooperation 
through the patent pool in avoiding the tragedy of anti-commons is large, while at the same time 
there can be a big coordination problem, since an individual firm (especially a firm specialized 
in research) may prefer higher royalty rate at the expense of others (Aoki and Nagaoka (2004, 
2005)). We have also found that the number of essential patents has increased significantly over 
time, and many patents have been applied even after the standard was set. We identify three 
important reasons for why the essential patents are many and increase over time: they cover a 
number of different technology fields, there exist a number of firms active in R&D even in a 
narrowly defined technology field and firms can expand their patent portfolio by using patent 
applications based on earlier priority dates (continuations, CIP and divisions) in the USA even  13
after the standard specification is set. Around 40% of the essential US patents for these 
standards are obtained by using these applications. However, our analysis does not support the 
view that a firm with pioneering patents obtains more subsequent patents, using these practices.   
  There may be two important policy implications. First, it makes a good sense that the 
disclosure policy as well as the licensing commitment required by a standard body covers not 
only granted patents, but also pending patents as well as the patents to be applied in the future 
with respect to the standard. Second, the case for the reform of the continuations and related 
application practices in the US (see Lemley and Moore (2003)) may be strong from the 
perspective of efficient use of patented technologies for a standard. Our results indicate that 
these practices are not used more by a firm with pioneering inventions, suggesting that the 
success of obtaining patents based on continuations and related practices may depend more on 
the patenting strategy of a firm than on the quality of its inventions.   
                     14
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i ETSI (The European Telecommunications Standards Institute) defines the essentiality of a patent as 
follows: “ESSENTIAL" as applied to IPR means that it is not possible on technical (but not 
commercial) grounds, taking into account normal technical practice and the state of the art generally 
available at the time of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or 
operate EQUIPMENT or METHODS which comply with a STANDARD without infringing that 
IPR.” The evaluation of the essentiality of a patent is far from being trivial. The patent pool 
organization usually hires outside independent experts to evaluate such essentialities, so as to avoid 
including substitute patents in a pool which might raise an antitrust concern and to ensure the fair 
distribution of royalty income among the member firms. 
ii  Goodman and Myers (2005)   
iii  3C does not classify the essential patents according to patent families. This makes us to use the 
number of US patents as a measure of the number of essential patents. 
iv  Some firms specify only Japanese patents to the ARIB which is a national body. We have 
identified the corresponding US patents by using the Derwent families.   
v  More detailed analysis is available from the author. Table 1 Three technical standards and patent pools
Standard Pool Admin.,
Year
Members of the pool









Originally (July 1997) 7
firms, 1university;
22 firms, 1 univ. as of April
2004
Originally 125 patents (34
families); currently(July 2004)
 644 patents (127 families)







Company of Japan, IBM
180 US patents for player, and







Philips, 1998 Philips, Sony, Pioneer,LG
131 US patents for DVD players,















7 firms for W-CDMA
no significant third-party
evaluations (954 W-CDMA
related patents (in terms of US
patents) and 857 cdma2000
related patents submitted to the














Source: based on http://www.3gpatents.com; http://www.mpegla.com; DOJ Review Letter from Joel Klein to Carey R. Ramos,
June 10, 1999; DOJ Review Letter from Joel Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney, December 16, 1998.Table 2 Types of firms which own essential 
patents (Number of firms)
MPEG2 DVD
(reader) ３G (WCDMA) Total %
Manufacturing firms (licensor and
licensee) 17 10 19 46 79.3%
Non-manufacturing user 3 1 2 6 10.3%
Pure licensor 3 0 3 6 10.3%
Total 23 11 24 58 100.0%
Note 1.  Pure licensor includes a firm specialized in R&D, a firm specialized in patent portfolio management
and a university.
Note 2. Based on the firms belonging to patent pools for MPEG２ and DVD. Based on the firm which declare
the ownership of essential patents to the ARIB for 3G.Table 3  The number of firms owning the essential patents 
for DVD (player and recorder)






G01 Measuring; Testing G01D 2 3
G02 Optics G02B 1 1
G06 G06F 7 15
G06 G06K 4 13
G06 G06T 1 1
G09 G09B 1 1
G09 G09G 1 1
G10 G10H 2 3
G10 G10L 2 4
G11 G11B 12 236
G11 G11C 2 3
G11 G11D 1 1
G11 G11G 1 1
H03 H03K 1 1
H03 H03M 5 11
H04 H04B 2 6
H04 H04H 2 4
H04 H04K 1 1
H04 H04L 6 10
H04 H04N 10 124
H04 H04R 1 1
H04 H04S 1 2
Human necessities A63 Sports; Games; Amusements A63H 1 1
B11 Other B11B 2 2

























MPEG2, US patents DVD(reader), US
patents
W-CDMA, US patents
A:priority date on or later than the month
of the first determination of standard
specification
C: applied on or later than the month of
the first determination of standard
specification, with priority date before the
month of the first determination of
standard specification
P: applied but not yet registered before
the month of the first determination of
standard specification
R: registered before the month of the
first determination of standard
specificationTable  4.  The essential patents which were 
obtained, using divisions, continuations and 
continuations-in-parts
Total those which enjoy
earlier filing dates
Continuat
ions CIP Divisions Total per
patent
85 37 44 9 32 85 2.30
44% 52% 11% 38%
180 83 34 5 62 101 1.22
46% 34% 5% 61%
131 47 38 9 15 62 1.32
36% 61% 15% 24%
396 167 116 23 109 248 1.49
42% 47% 9% 44%
DVD (3C)
Note １. 10 firm for MPEG2 include Sony, Philips, Thomson licensing, Mitsubishi, Matsushita, GE
technology, General instrument, JVC, Samsung. And Toshiba.
Note ２．There are some overlaps between continuations, CIP and divisions.
Number of essential
patents Frequency of continutations, CIP and divisions
MPEG2 (10 firms)
DVD (６C)
TotalTable 5 Testing proposition 1(dependent variable:  the share of the essential 
patents using continuations, CIPs or divisions)
Basic specification Extended specification
contcipy contcipdivy contcipy contcipdivy






-0.133 0.074 * -0.125 0.067 *
quality of early stage
patents lncitedness -0.188 0.085 ** -0.166 0.077 ** -0.199 0.084 ** -0.161 0.076 *
age -0.021 0.022 -0.044 0.020 ** -0.065 0.312 0.130 0.285
age
2
0.002 0.011 -0.006 0.010
MPEG dummy mpeg 0.132 0.088 0.083 0.080 0.040 0.105 -0.020 0.096
Number of obs=21 Number of obs=21 Number of obs=21 Number of obs=21
 R-squared     =  0.2828  R-squared     =  0.3897 R-squared     = 0.4208  R-squared     = 0.5049
Adj R-squared =  0.1563  Adj R-squared =  0.2821 Adj R-squared =  0.2278 Adj R-squared =  0.3398
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Share of essential patents
using continuations or CIPsAppendix:  Descriptive statistics of 
the essential patents by firm
Note. Patents represents the number of essential parents held by a firm, patentsb
represents that at the standard formation stage,  contcip is the number of the essential 
patents using continuation or CIP, contcipdiv is the number of the essential patents 
using continuation, CIP or division.
Note. The sample focus on the firms with at least three essential patents.
Variable Obs Mean Std. DevMin Max
patents 21 18.86 18.58 3 66
patentsb 21 7.62 4.94 2 22
contcip 21 5.10 5.11 0 22
contcipdiv 21 8.00 8.87 0 38
citedeness 21 29.97 19.53 11.9 95.2
age 21 13 1.9 11.0 17.9
mpeg 21 0.52 0.51 0 1
c6 21 0.33 0.48 0 1
c3 21 0.14 0.36 0 1